Rethinking IC Layout Vulnerability: Simulation-Based Hardware Trojan Threat Assessment with High Fidelity
Xinming Wei, Jiaxi Zhang, Guojie Luo
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2024 · Day 3 · Continental Ballroom 5
This talk introduces **Silicon Critique**, a novel, simulation-based framework designed for high-fidelity hardware Trojan threat assessment in integrated circuit (IC) layouts. Presented by Xinming Wei, Jiaxi Zhang, and Guojie Luo, the research addresses a critical vulnerability in the modern IC supply chain, where the widespread adoption of **fabless design** and outsourced manufacturing creates fertile ground for malicious hardware modifications, commonly known as **fabrication-time attacks**. These attacks can embed **Hardware Trojans** into a chip's finalized layout, leading to functional changes, denial of service, or information leakage.
AI review
This research presents Silicon Critique, a high-fidelity, simulation-based framework for assessing hardware Trojan vulnerability in IC layouts. It directly addresses the critical flaw in traditional geometric-only metrics by leveraging commercial CAD tools to realistically simulate fabrication-time attacks, providing actionable insights for designers to build more resilient hardware. The pragmatic focus on increasing attack difficulty rather than absolute prevention is a crucial shift for practical hardware security.