Can we cast a ballot as intended and be receipt free?
Henri Devillez, Olivier Pereira, Thomas Peters, Quentin Yang
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2024 · Day 3 · Continental Ballroom 6
In the realm of electronic voting, ensuring both the integrity of a voter's choice and the secrecy of that choice is paramount. This talk, presented by Henri Devillez and co-authored with Olivier Pereira, Thomas Peters, and Quentin Yang, delves into the intricate relationship between two critical security properties: **cast-as-intended (CAI)** and **receipt-freeness (RF)**. CAI guarantees that the vote a voter intended to cast is precisely what is recorded, while RF prevents voters from proving how they voted, thereby combating vote selling and coercion. The research explores the fundamental limits of achieving both properties simultaneously, particularly in different interaction models of voting systems.
AI review
This research delivers a critical impossibility result for achieving both cast-as-intended and receipt-freeness in non-interactive e-voting, then provides concrete interactive protocols that succeed. It's foundational work that redefines the design space for secure electronic voting systems. Essential for anyone serious about the field.