GhostType: The Limits of Using Contactless Electromagnetic Interference to Inject Phantom Keys into Analog Circuits of Keyboards

Qinhong Jiang

Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium 2024 · Day 3 · Physical-layer Attacks

In a groundbreaking presentation at NDSS 2024, Qinhong Jiang unveiled "GhostType," a novel attack demonstrating the pervasive vulnerability of modern keyboards to contactless electromagnetic interference (EMI). This research, conducted by a collaborative team from Zhejiang University, the University of Michigan, and Northeastern University, challenges the fundamental assumption of trust in keyboard keystroke sensing mechanisms. Unlike traditional keyboard security threats like keylogging or BadUSB attacks, GhostType exploits vulnerabilities in the analog circuits of unaltered, legitimate keyboards, allowing adversaries to inject "phantom keys" without any physical contact or modification to the device.