Power-Related Side-Channel Attacks using the Android Sensor Framework
Mathias Oberhuber
Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium 2025 · Day 1 · Android Security 1
In an era where mobile devices are central to our digital lives, the security of sensitive data processed on these platforms is paramount. This talk by Mathias Oberhuber from the NDSS Symposium unveils a novel and concerning class of **power-related side-channel attacks** that exploit the Android sensor framework. The core finding is that the Android sensor interface, typically used for functionalities like compass navigation or motion tracking, can be repurposed as an unprivileged, software-only proxy for measuring device power consumption. This circumvents the traditional security barriers that prevent direct access to power interfaces on Android, opening a new vector for data exfiltration.
AI review
Solid original research demonstrating that the Android sensor API leaks power side-channel information sufficient to recover AES key bytes and steal cross-origin pixel data — no privileges required. The attack surface is novel, the cross-device validation is rigorous, and the dual PoCs (local crypto and remote web) land the threat model convincingly. It stops just short of a 5 because the sensor-as-power-proxy intuition isn't entirely unprecedented in academic literature, and the AES key recovery results feel partially scoped rather than full-key.